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PROSECUTING RAPE AS A WAR CRIME

The HonorableRichardJ. Goldstone*
Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great privilege to have been invited to
deliver this first lecture in a series addressing topics that are of special
importance.
I have said for a number of years now that one of the most important
successes of the United Nations War Crimes Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda has been in the development of international
humanitarian law. One area, unrelated to today's topic, pertains to
narrowing the traditional difference between international armed conflict
and internal armed conflict and the protection to which innocent civilians
are entitled. Traditionally, civilians in civil wars have been entitled to far
less protection than in transnational wars. This distinction is not a rational
one. It has been narrowed in opinions of the tribunals almost to the point of
extinction.
The second area relates to the treatment of gender-related crime and
particularly systematic mass rape. In September 1998, a Trial Chamber of
the Rwanda Tribunal, sitting in Arusha, delivered judgment in the case of
the Prosecutorv. Jean-PaulAkayesu.' The three judges were drawn from
three countries around the world.
On behalf of the international
community, the judges stated in clear terms that in their opinion, "Rape is a
form of aggression. Rape is a violation of personal dignity," and "Rape and
sexual violence constitute one of the worst ways of harming the victim as
he or she suffers both bodily and mental harm." 2 It is significant that the
judges referred to "he" as well as "she" because one of the horrible
phenomena to come out of these wars is the rape of men by men.
For the first time in the history of humanitarian law, that Chamber of
the Rwanda Tribunal handed down a conviction for rape as a crime against
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I Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgement, I.C.T.R., No. ICTR-96-4-T (1998), available at
http://www.ictr.org/default.htm.
2 Id.at 687 and 731.
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humanity, and they held further that the rapes, which had been condoned
and encouraged by Akayesu, also constituted the crime of genocide.
To date, the Rwanda Tribunal has indicted seventeen men and one
woman for gender crimes, charging the suspects with genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes.3 The Yugoslavian Tribunal sitting in
The Hague has convicted eight perpetrators of rape, has held sexual slavery
to be a crime against humanity, and more than half of its public
indictments, including that of Karadzic, 4 the former head of the Republika
Srbska, and Mladic, 5 his army chief, incorporate gender crimes.6
In the past decade of tumultuous progress in international criminal law,
the advances made in the recognition and prosecution of gender crimes
committed during armed conflict are particularly noteworthy. This is all the
more so because of the history of virtual effacement of these crimes from
international humanitarian law. Among the many unique characteristics of
the International Criminal Tribunals for both the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda from their very inception has been the concern shown to ensure
that there would be prosecutions for gender crimes.
One of the early United Nations resolutions leading to the decision to
establish the Yugoslavia Tribunal contained the first condemnation ever by
the Security Council of rape in war.7 It declared that the Security Council
was appalled by reports of the massive organized and systematic detention
and rape of women, in particular Muslim women in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. This reaction against sexual violence was a key element in
the motivation for the establishment of the tribunal.
The Secretary-General's Report, which led to the drafting of the statute
for the Yugoslavian Tribunal, refers to "[s]exual assaults". Article 5(g) of
the proposed statute broke new ground by enumerating rape as a crime
against humanity. 8 It went on to suggest that given the fact that the
Tribunal would have to deal with victims of rape and sexual assault, due
consideration should be given to the appointment of qualified women in the
Office of Prosecutor. 9 So, even before the Tribunal began its work, the
For information concerning the number and nature of the indictments issued by the
Rwanda Tribunal, see generally http://www.ictr.org.
4 Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Indictment, I.C.T.Y, No. IT-95-5/18 (1995), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/kar-ii951116e.htm.
3

5

id.

6 For the number and nature of indictments issued by the Yugoslavia Tribunal, see

generally http://www.icty.org.
7 See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
8 Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/S25704.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2003).
9
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Security Council and the Secretary-General were giving specific attention
to gender-related matters. The suggestions were accepted, and the statutes
of the two Tribunals set important precedents in enumerating rape as a
crime against humanity and entrenching various procedural safeguards for
the protection of victims and witnesses in sexual assaults. The statute for
the Rwanda Tribunal went even further than its Yugoslavian counterpart,
especially referring to "[r]ape, enforced prostitution and any form of
indecent assault" as violations of Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.'o
This statement stands in stark contrast to predecessors of the tribunals.
The statutes of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo contained no
reference at all to rape. Although the French and Soviet prosecutors before
the Nuremberg Tribunal introduced evidence of rape in the course of
establishing war crimes and crimes against humanity, the judgment does
not once mention rape.
The Tokyo Tribunal" expressly charged rape, but not one of the
women victims was called to give evidence. The judgment records that
approximately 20,000 cases of rape occurred in the city of Nanking during
the first month of the occupation. It devotes one paragraph in the opinion
to the gender crimes that gave the name to the "Rape of Nanking". Rape
was subsumed under the general charges of command responsibility for the
atrocities in Nanking. While crimes against humanity were based in part on
evidence of rape committed by troops under the command of the defendant,
the Tribunal completely ignored the equally notorious forcing of thousands
of comfort women into prostitution in Japanese military brothels.
Men had written the laws of war in an age when rape was regarded as
being no more than an inevitable consequence of war. The two UN
Tribunals truly represent a distinct shift in mindset. They are characterized
as having the specific intent to prosecute the perpetrators of sexual assaults.
In fulfilling that intent, the Tribunals have advanced the substance of
international humanitarian law through defining rape, sexual violence, and
sexual slavery and broadening the categories of international crime under
which judicial bodies can prosecute gender crimes.

10Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such
Violations Committed in the territory of Neighboring States, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR,
49th sess., 4353d mtg., Annex, at art. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598.
11 Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery.
12 See IRIS CHANG, THE RAPE OF NANKING: THE FORGOTTEN HOLOCAUST OF WORLD WAR

11(1997) (relating the history of the "comfort women" program and the Tokyo Tribunal's
treatment of rape as a war crime).
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In the time remaining, I propose to consider those advances, the
definitions of rape and other gender offenses, and the procedural rules
designed to protect the physical and mental wellness of victims and the
witnesses to those crimes.
Much of the credit for these advances goes to human rights
organizations. These organizations alerted me to the anger and frustration
of the victims of those crimes and the concern of many thousands of
women in dozens of countries. Soon after I arrived as the Chief Prosecutor
in The Hague on August 15, 1994, 1 was inundated with letters and
petitions from women and men in the United States, Canada, and many of
the western European nations. The letters implored us to give adequate
attention to gender-related crimes. It soon became clear that systematic
mass rape could not have been peculiar to such different situations in the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Why should that occurrence have
suddenly become a feature of the last decade of the 2 0th Century? The
answer is that for many centuries domestic and international legal systems
had ignored gender-related crimes. What impressed me is that the letters
had been individually written - they were not simply standard form letters
or petitions. Many people, and particularly women, had taken the trouble to
put in their own words, sometimes in broken English, their concern about
rape either being ignored once again or not receiving adequate attention
from the Tribunal.
As a consequence of those letters, I appointed an outstanding
American lawyer, Patricia Sellers, to the inner cabinet that I set up at the
Tribunal. I appointed her as the legal advisor to the Office of the
Prosecutor for Gender Crimes. We agreed that it was important that her
brief should not only relate to the manner in which we deal with rape in
indictments and investigations, but that she should also be concerned with
gender issues within the Office of the Prosecutor.
I was amazed at the gender bias that emerged in our international
office.
One of the precipitating factors was the high number of
investigators amongst the staff of the office. For the most part, they were
police and army officers. They came from many countries on five different
continents. In all but one or two, there were no senior female investigators.
Their culture was not such as to make them concerned about gender-related
crime. It soon became apparent to me that it was essential to make them all
aware that any form of gender discrimination or inappropriate language in
the office would simply not be tolerated. I became convinced that if we did
have an appropriate gender policy in the Office of the Prosecutor, we would
have little chance of getting it right outside of the office. Patricia Sellers
applied herself with great diligence to a difficult task. Many of the
developments to which I will refer are the result of her initiatives and her
imaginative approach.
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The initial indictments were issued under tremendous pressure to
obtain crucial funding from the United Nations. Indeed, soon after I arrived
in the middle of August 1994, I was told that there was no budget for our
Tribunal, and that I would have to appear before the budget committee of
the United Nations at the beginning of November of that year - less than
three months later. I was advised in a friendly fashion - and correctly as it
turned out - that if we did not have an indictment out by that time, we
would not get any money for the following year. The result was that we
had to devote all of our meager resources to that endeavor (and there were
then only twenty-three members of staff in the office, and very few of them
were investigators). We had the important report from the Commission of
Experts (the Bassiouni Committee) and we used it to find people against
whom there might be sufficient evidence to justify indictments.
Just before the end of October 1994, we decided there was only one
defendant against whom there was sufficient evidence available to justify
an indictment. His name was Dragan Nikolic. We indicted him for a
number of murders and the torture of innocent civilians. 13 Now, Nikolic
was not an appropriate first person for an indictment by the first
international war crimes tribunal, but we had no option. In order for the
work to continue, we had to get out an indictment quickly. That is the
explanation for the Nikolic indictment.
In the view of the lawyers who worked on the Nikolic indictment,
there was insufficient evidence to justify charging him with gender crimes.
That, however, did not deter one of the two women judges on the Tribunal,
Odio Bennito, from raising the gender issue very forcefully early in the
proceedings. 14 In one of the early procedural applications, she publicly
exhorted the Office of the Prosecutor to include gender crimes in the
indictment. She relied on some of the testimony associated with the
indictment and took the other two male members of her trial chamber with
her. In their interlocutory judgment, they called for gender crimes to be
added to the indictment. They made the following statement:
It appears that women and girls were subjected to rape and other forms
of sexual assault during their detention . . . Dragan Nikolic and other
persons connected with the camp are related to have been directly involved
in some of those rapes and sexual assaults. These allegations do not seem
to relate solely to isolated incidents. The Trial Chamber feels that the
prosecutor may be well advised to review these statements carefully with a
view to ascertaining whether to charge Dragan Nikolic with rapes and other

13 Prosecutor v. Dragon Nikolic, Indictment, I.C.T.Y., No. IT-94-2-PT (1994), available
at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/nik-ii941104e.htm.
14 Judge Odio Benito became the Deputy President of Costa Rica and is now a deputy
president of the International Criminal Court.
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forms of sexual assault, either as a crime against humanity or as grave
breach or war crimes. 15
Now that was a most unusual, far reaching and surprising invitation. It
came as a very welcome surprise because, as I mentioned earlier, in the
statute of the Tribunal, rape was referred to only as a crime against
humanity. Rape was not traditionally regarded as a war crime on its own,
and it certainly was never included amongst the crimes listed in the 1949
Geneva Conventions as a "grave breach". So, this was a huge step forward
and an invitation that we accepted with alacrity.
The consequences were relevant also for domestic courts. This
followed from the provisions of the Geneva Conventions that oblige all
nations that have ratified the Conventions to prosecute any person
suspected of having committed a grave breach. 6 It does not matter where
the crime was committed - universal jurisdiction in respect of such crimes
was established. Now, 189 countries have thus far ratified the Geneva
Convention, and each one of them has obliged itself to prosecute in reliance
upon that universal jurisdiction. Here was a suggestion for the first time
ever that such a violation constituted a gender-related crime.
Some months later, the judges of the Rwanda Tribunal were similarly
progressive in their approach to the prosecution of gender crimes. The
initial indictment against Akayesu did not charge him with gender crimes.
When the trial commenced, however, witnesses began to make repeated
reference in their testimony to widespread rape and sexual violence in the
Taba Commune in Rwanda. They also referred to Akayesu's tacit support
for the commission of those gender crimes. The only woman judge in the
Rwanda Tribunal, Navantham Pillay, (who I am proud to say is a South
African), was astute in eliciting from witnesses evidence of sexual violence,
taking initiative from the bench to do so. Her actions, combined with the
amicus brief of the Coalition for Women's Human Rights in Conflict
Situations urging the Tribunal to request an amendment of the indictments
to include sexual violence, resulted in a postponement of the trial during
which the indictment was amended to include charges of sexual violence
against displaced women who sought refuge at the Taba Commune.
This judicial diligence in facilitating testimony on gender crimes and
in urging the inclusion of such crimes in indictments, together with the
diligence of Patricia Sellers and others in the Office of the Prosecutor,
contributed to the significant progress that the Tribunals have made in their
recognition and prosecution of gender crimes.

15 Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Judgement, i.C.T.Y., No. IT-94-2-R61 (1995), available at
http://www.icty.org.
16 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
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- More regularly, indictments began to include gender-related crimes.
In 1996, I issued the first indictment focusing exclusively on sexual assault,
the so-called Foca indictment.' 7 Foca was the place where the sexual
crimes were committed. Therefore, there has been activism from the judges
and there has been activism from the Office of the Prosecutor in this area.
Substantively, one of the problems we faced in charging rape as a war
crime was the absence of any definition of that crime. International law had
never defined the crime of rape. That, in itself, is significant. A crime that
had been occurring for centuries during wars had never received sufficient
attention to justify definition. In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber of the
Rwanda Tribunal took a major step toward filling this gap in the law. It
held, "The central elements of the crime of rape should not be captured in a
mechanical description of objects and body parts.' 18 The judges defined
rape as "a physical invasion of a sexual nature committed on a person under
circumstances which are coercive."' 19 They added, "Sexual violence, which
includes rape, is considered to be any act of sexual nature,'20 which is
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.
Now, that was a huge step forward and in advance of the approach to
rape in most domestic jurisdictions around the world. If anything, it goes
too far to the extent that it does not require any act of penetration of or by a
sexual organ to constitute rape. It was a crucial step forward, however, to
the extent that it concentrated upon the all-important aspect of the violation
of the victim. The progressiveness of the definition is re-enforced when
taken in conjunction with the procedural aspects of the Tribunals' fight
against gender crimes.
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of both of the Tribunals contain
a specific provision dealing with the admissibility of evidence in cases of
sexual assault. Rule 96 represents, again, several significant departures
from the domestic practice in many countries. First, the tribunal, according
to the rule, need not require the corroboration of the testimony of a victim
of sexual violence, thereby dispensing with the evidentiary distrust of
female complainants. 2 1 Many countries, and particularly in the Anglo17 Prosecutor v. Gagovic, Indictment, I.C.T.Y., No. IT-96-23-PT (1996), available at

http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/foc-ii960626e.htm.
18 Akayesu Judgement, No. ICTR-96-4-T.
19Id. In the judgment, The Chamber defined rape as "a physical invasion of a sexual
nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence,
which includes rape, is considered to be any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a
person under circumstances which are coercive. This act must be committed (a) as part of a
wide spread or systematic attack; (b) on a civilian population; (c) on certain catalogued
discriminatory grounds, namely: national, ethnic, political, racial, or religious grounds."
20
21

id.
RULES OF EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR

RWANDA,

Rule 96, available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/rules/index.htm.
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American world, require corroboration of a woman's evidence on the issue
of sexual violence. This is an aberrational requirement that does not apply
in other areas of the law. Second, Rule 96 specifically excludes the
admissibility of prior sexual conduct of the victim, dispensing with the22
implication that a woman with a sexual history is an unreliable witness.
This exclusion judicially impedes the possibility that women who were
assaulted and raped by men would have to face those pre-war relationships
It also begins to address
being used as a justification for rape.
misconceptions about women and their credibility.
Finally, Rule 96 outlines the parameters within which consent may be
raised as a defense to a charge of rape or sexual assault. 23 This starts from
the premise that consent cannot be a defense if the victim had experienced
or had reason to fear violence, duress, detention, or psychological
aggression. The procedure by which evidence of consent may be admitted
requires the defendant overcome the burden of proving to the Trial
Chamber, on camera that the evidence is relevant and credible.
Consequently, the opportunity is there, but the burden of proof is placed
very clearly on the defendant to establish why, in that war situation, consent
is at all relevant to the defense.
The broad gender sensitive definition, combined with the specific
exclusion of sex and prior sexual history and the curtailment of the defense
of consent are significant achievements. They represent a notable change in
the way in which international criminal law approaches gender crimes.
The Yugoslavia Tribunal relied on this progressive definition adopted
in Akayesu in a number of other cases. It has not, however, all gone one
way. On the one hand, the Yugoslavia Tribunal made a further progressive
finding. It held that forcible oral sex is "[a] most humiliating and degrading
act upon human dignity and could rightly be included in the definition of
rape. ' ,24 You will agree that this was an important step extending the
definition of rape to include forcible oral sex. This also diverges from the
practice and the law in many domestic jurisdictions. On the other hand,
however, the Trial Chamber recast the definition to require penetration as
an element of the offence of rape.
Overall, I would suggest the jurisprudence of the Tribunals in this
important area is positive. They have also not avoided telling the detail of
the stories of the witnesses and victims. This is a welcome departure from
the Nuremberg precedent where the prosecutors refused to detail gender
crimes while not flinching from gory descriptions of other heinous crimes.
This kind of criticism of the Nuremberg proceedings should take into
account that the times were very different. It is always unfair to judge what
22

Id.

Id.
24 Prosecutor v. Furundzjia, Judgement, I.C.T.Y., No. IT-95-17/l-T (1998), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/trialc2/judgement/fur-tj98121 Oe.pdf.
23
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happened 50 or 60 years ago by today's standards. However, it remains
noteworthy that some of the prosecutors who were involved in genderrelated crimes at Nuremberg refused to read the details from affidavits they
had because they felt it was too shocking to speak in public about these
crimes.
The statute for the International Criminal Court (the "ICC")2 5 has
forwardly advanced the work of the U.N. Tribunals. Gender crimes are no
longer subsumed under outrages on personal dignity. Rape, sexual slavery,
forced pregnancy, forced sterilization and other forms of sexual violence
are now expressly enumerated as crimes against humanity in Article 7 and
as war crimes relating to both international armed conflict and noninternational armed conflict. This is significant in that the Rome Statute for
the ICC represents the normative benchmark of international criminal law,
and gender crimes are now given the recognition they were denied for so
many years. One question, of course, is how these advances will actually
affect attitudes and lead to some form of deterrence. Another question
relates to the extent to which they will influence the prosecution of gender
crimes before domestic courts.
I really think there is a challenge here and an opening for lawyers in
the United States and other democracies to use these advances in
international law and to place them before domestic judges and so influence
attitudes toward these horrible crimes. The work of the International
Tribunals and the promise of the ICC provide a strong basis for the
international community to start addressing in a more appropriate manner
the phenomenon of rape, forced pregnancy, sexual slavery, and other
gender crimes committed during armed conflict. It is my hope that the
history of impunity for gender crimes under international criminal law will
resolutely be replaced in the future by accountability and deterrence and
prevention.

25

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.

A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm.

